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Proposals  that  would  establish  a  two-year  budget  and  appropriations 
cycle  for the U.S. government  have been offered  by both Democrats  and 
Republicans  in recent years.  This article analyzes the potential  impact 
of  such  budgeting.  The  first  section  examines  the budget  period  in 
theory and practice.  The  second  section  introduces  federal biennial- 
budgeting  proposals  and the core arguments  offered  in support  of  this 
reform.  The  next  three  sections  draw  heavily  on  studies  of  state 
budgeting  -- including a new biennial-budgeting  survey prepared  by the 
state  of  New  Jersey  --  to  evaluate  these  arguments.  The  article 
concludes  the  federal  budget  process  can be  structured  in a way  that 
permits  the  advantages  of  biennial  budgeting  to  outweigh  its 
disadvantages. Throughout  the 199Os, America's  two major  political  parties  have 
been competing  to show their interest in a more effective and efficient 
federal government.  One type of reform that has received  considerable 
attention  from members  of both parties  is biennial  budgeting.  A  two- 
year  budget  and  appropriations  cycle  was  endorsed  by  the  Clinton 
Administration  in  its  1993  National  Performance  Review  (NPR) report 
(Gore 1993).  This reform was also favored by most members of the 103rd 
Congress's  Joint  Committee  on  the  Organization  of  Congress,  and 
recommended  in  a  January  1995  report  assembled  for  Senate  Majority 
Leader  Robert  Dole by  the Senate budget  committee  (Joint Committee  On 
the Organization  of Congress  1993; Budget changes planned  1995). 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  analyze  the  potential 
consequences of biennial federal budgeting.  Central to this analysis is 
an examination of lessons provided by the experience of the states.  The 
article's  first  section  considers  the length  of  the budget  period  in 
theory  and practice,  including  a brief  history  of  state  trends.  The 
second section  introduces  federal biennial-budgeting  proposals  and the 
core  arguments  offered  in  support  of  this  reform.  The  next  three 
sections draw heavily  on studies of state budgeting  -- including  a new 
biennial-budgeting  survey  prepared  by  the  state  of  New  Jersey  -- to 
evaluate  these  arguments.  A  concluding  section  outlines  policy 
implications  and offers  suggestions  for future research. 
Looking to the states for lessons on federal biennial budgeting  is 
not  novel.  The  approach  has  been  employed  by  a  number  of  budget 
analysts in articles and reports; the present article follows their lead 
(see,  for example, Kirkman 1987; Meyers 1988; Irving 1993; Snell1993a).l 
At  the  same  time,  this  work  offers  its  own  contribution  to  the 2 
literature  by  providing  not  only  an  updated  assessment  but  also  an 
examination  that draws on a larger pool 
studies. 
of evidence  than most previous 
The Budget Period and State Trends 
A  budget  period  of  one  year  has  long  been  the  norm  in  public 
finance.  In  fact,  researchers  seeking  to  explain  the  budgetary 
principle  of  annuality  have  often  stressed  custom  and  tradition,  not 
fiscal  theory.  Renee  Stourm's  landmark work,  for example,  emphasizes 
that  "this  period  corresponds  with  the  customary  measure  of  human 
estimates"  (Stourm 1917, 319; see also Sundelson  1935). 
There  is no doubt that the year has deep roots  in the history  of 
human calculation.  But the practice of annual budgeting  also has long- 
standing fiscal significance because it measures a cycle of fundamental 
importance to agriculturally-oriented  communities  (Buck 1934, 127-130). 
Planning according  to this natural cycle was crucial  in pre-industrial 
societies  and remains essential  in the rural communities  of today. 
In England,  adoption of annuality as a public budgeting  principle 
can  also  be  explained  partly  by  the  historical  development  of 
parliamentary  authority.  Since involvement in state finance has always 
been  the source of their power, members of Parliament  chose to take up 
the  Crown's  tax  and  spending  proposals  each  year  not  only  to permit 
frequent  review  of the monarch's  fiscal activities  but  also  to ensure 
that  their  grievances  would  be  heard  regularly.  Seen  from  the 
perspective  of a young  Parliament  engaged  in an ongoing  struggle  with 
its king, one can easily appreciate the desire for a budget period of no 
longer  than  a year  (Maitland 1920, 444; Ogg  1944;  Punnett  1968,  280- 3 
282). 
The federal government  of the United States has always adhered  to 
the  norm  of  annuality  with  respect  to  the budget  period.2  In  fact, 
annual fiscal statements were issued even before the nation's budgetary 
system was  formalized  by  the Budget  and Accounting  Act  of  1921.  The 
original  thirteen  states also employed this principle.  Nearly  all the 
states  convened  their  legislatures  annually  and  practiced  annual 
budgeting  prior  to 1840. 
In the 184Os, however,  states began  to harness  their legislatures 
by  moving  to  biennial  sessions  and  budgets.  Historical  research 
identifies  six  reasons  for  this  development.  One  is  the  rise  of  a 
belief  that state assemblies needed less time to meet due to increased 
popular  participation  in  public  decision  making.  In  particular, 
citizens had increasingly been given the right to elect public officials 
who  were  previously  appointed,  and  to  alter  state  policies  through 
constitutional  conventions  and referenda.3 
The nineteenth-century  trend toward biennial state action was also 
due to declining public confidence in the legislative branch.  Like the 
federal  government  of  our  era,  assemblies  were  often  criticized  for 
passing  too many  laws that conferred  benefits  upon  special  interests. 
Other  arguments  for the move  to constrain  state legislatures  included 
the following:  government costs would be reduced since most legislators 
were  paid  on  a  per  diem  and  mileage  basis;  assemblies  would  be 
encouraged  to increase the pace of their work  (as  a further inducement, 
many states placed restrictions on the length of legislative  sessions); 
and biennial  sessions would yield not only more regular attendance  but 4 
also less frequent changes in state laws.  Just four state legislatures 
-- New  Jersey,  New  York,  South  Carolina,  and  Rhode  Island  -- were 
meeting  annually by 1940. 
The  century-long  trend  toward biennial  budgeting  came  to an  end 
after World War II.  Many state assemblies  returned to annual  sessions 
and budgets  in response  to increasing  demands  for public  programs  and 
facilities.  An  added  incentive  in  the  1960s  and  1970s  was  that 
annuality  enabled more rapid adjustment  to changes  in federal policies 
and expenditures,  especially  in the realm of grants  to states  (Meyers 
1988, 23).  The year  1968 was  the first since the 1850s to see annual 
legislative  sessions  in a majority  of states. 
During  the past  decade,  however,  signs  of  a revived  interest  in 
biennial  state  budgeting  have  appeared  across  the nation  -- interest 
motivated  largely by an attempt  to focus greater  attention  on program 
reviews and long-range policy goals  (Kirkman 1987; Credible proposal  in 
a time of  fiscal  crisis  1992; Eckl  1993;  Snell  199333).  Nebraska  and 
Connecticut  adopted  two-year budgeting  in 1987 and 1991, respectively, 
and  the  idea has  been  under  consideration  more  recently  in Michigan, 
California  and New Jersey.  Today a biennial budget and appropriations 
cycle is employed  in 20 states  -- including 13 with annual  legislative 
sessions  (see Table  1). 
Proposals  and Arguments 
The  first  federal  bill  to  propose  a  biennial  budget  and 
appropriations  cycle  was  introduced  by  Leon  Panetta  during  his  first 
term  in  the  U.S.  House  of  Representatives.  His  proposal,  presented 
initially  in the fall of 1977, sought to improve Congress's  ability  to 5 
control the budget and conduct oversight by altering various aspects of 
the process  and  timetable  outlined  by the Congressional  Budget  Act of 
1974 (Panetta 1977).  Bipartisan support for this idea grew considerably 
during  the 198Os, partly  as a product  of frustration  caused by  rising 
fiscal deficits  (Whalen 1994).  As indicated above, biennial  budgeting 
remains popular  in the 1990s due to widespread  interest in streamlining 
and VVre-inventingl'  government. 
Researchers  and federal legislators have offered a wide variety of 
biennial-budgeting  proposals  since  1977.  Two  models  dominate:  the 
l'stretch"  model  and  the  llsplit-sessions"  model.4  The  first  stretches 
action on the budget  resolution over a period of two years.  Panetta's 
"Biennial Budgeting Act of 1977" is an example of this type of proposal. 
The  budget  schedule  contained  in  Panetta's  bill  began  with  the 
President's  submission of both a current services budget and a biennial 
budget  at  the  start  of  each  two-year  congressional  term  (the  odd- 
numbered  year).  The first six months of that year would be devoted  to 
formal  oversight  of  programs  and  agencies  by  the  committees  of  each 
house.  During the second six months, budget committees would report the 
first  budget  resolution  and  legislative  committees  would  report  all 
authorizing  legislation.  In the second year, Congress would  first act 
on  authorizing  bills  and  then  pass  both  budget  resolutions  and 
appropriations  legislation;  the biennium would begin October  1 of each 
even-numbered  year  (Panetta 1977). 
The  split-sessions  model  confines  budget  resolution  and 
appropriations  actions  to  the  first  session  of  a  Congress.  Its 
objective  is to start  the biennium  on October  1 of  each  odd-numbered year  (or by  the following  January  1 in 
even-numbered  year  free  for  oversight 
6 
some versions)  and  leave  each 
and  authorization  activities. 
Proposals of this sort have been introduced by a number of legislators, 
including  Senator  William  Roth  (R-Delaware)  and  Representatives  Lee 
Hamilton  (D-Indiana) and Ralph Regula  (R-Ohio). 
Although a rash of missed budget deadlines helped generate interest 
in biennial budgeting  during the 198Os, proponents of this reform often 
stress  that budgeting  will  remain difficult.  Budgetary  decisions  are 
political  decisions  --  they  cannot  be  made  easier  by  procedural 
revision.  The case for two-year budgeting does not involve the promise 
of bipartisan  fiscal harmony and timely budget agreements  (Meyers 1988, 
26).5  The case centers instead on the belief that a biennial budget and 
appropriations  cycle will  streamline  the budget  process;  make  federal 
policies more  effective;  and promote  economic stability.6 
Streamlining the  Budget Process 
Federal  budget  cycles  are  complex  and  overlapping.  Each  cycle 
involves  agency  and  White  House  preparation;  budget  submission; 
legislative  authorization;  development  and  approval  of  a  budget 
resolution  and appropriations;  execution;  and oversight  and auditing. 
Since each budget cycle requires approximately  39 months,  three or four 
cycles are likely to be in progress  at any time  (Lee and Johnson  1989, 
45J.l 
Supporters  of  biennial  federal  budgeting  argue  that  a  two  year 
budget  and  appropriations  period  would  relieve  participants  of  many 
routine and repetitive activities and allow them to use their time more 
efficiently.  In particular, proponents maintain that biennial budgeting 7 
would  make  more  time  and  resources  available  for  service  delivery, 
agency management,  legislative oversight and long-range analysis.  This 
view  is bolstered  by  numerous  studies which  suggest  that  the present 
budget process burdens officials withmeaningless  duplication; restricts 
time available for program reviews and other government activities;  and 
discourages  a  focus  on  the  long-term  consequences  of  decisions 
(Congressional Budget  Office  1977; Margeson  and  Saturn0  1987; Bowsher 
1988; General Accounting  Office  1989 and 1992). 
Opponents respond by maintaining  that two-year budgeting will lead 
only  to more  work  at  nearly  every  stage  in  the budget  cycle.  They 
contend that there would be additional work in the preparation  stage due 
to  the  extended  fiscal  period;  that budget  agreements  would  be  more 
difficult  to fashion  because  moving  to a biennial  process  raises  the 
stakes;  and  that  unexpected  but  inevitable  changes  (due  to  a  war, 
recession,  or  natural  disaster)  would  lead  to  frequent  fiscal 
adjustments  during  the budget period.  Another  concern  is that budget 
work will  expand to fill the time available. 
Since  states  provide  natural  "laboratories  of  democracy," 
researchers  and  policymakers  interested  in  federal  policy  have  often 
examined  state experiences  in search of legislative and administrative 
insights.  Indeed, framers of the national budget system established  in 
1921 were  influenced  heavily  by  state practices  (Buck 1934, 41).  The 
recent release of a new survey of biennial state budgeting,  conducted by 
the  state  of New  Jersey,  makes  the present  an  especially  appropriate 
time to look once again toward the states.  Reference to various studies 
of  state  budgeting  will  be  made  throughout  the  remainder  of  this 8 
article. 
Before  examining  state-level  experience  for  insight  into  the 
question  of  whether  biennial  budgeting  will  streamline  the  budget 
process,  however,  it is necessary  to offer a comment on the suggestion 
that biennial  budgets  require more work than annual budgets.  The flaw 
in that argument is that both the President and Congress are required to 
prepare  multi-year  budgets  under  the  present  system.  Moreover, 
according  to  the  Office  of  Management  and  Budget  (OMB)  r second-year 
numbers  are not  only  as precisely  worked  out as  those  for  the  fiscal 
year at hand but they also serve as ceilings for the next year's budget 
request  (discussed in Rauch 1986, 2319). 
Previous Studies 
In  recent  years 
often  indicated  that 
federal  budget  participants  and  observers  have 
roughly  90 percent  of the nation's  annual  budget 
and appropriations  actions represent a repetition of the previous year's 
work  (see,  for  example,  Domenici  1987;  Joint  Committee  on  the 
Organization  of  Congress  1993,  117;  and  Scully  1995).  But  concrete 
estimates of the potential  savings of biennial federal budgeting  do not 
exist.  Moreover,  most  predictions  on  the  workload  impact  of  such 
budgeting  are offered by observers  -- such as Greenstein  (1993) Irving 
(1994) --  who ground their estimates in little or no supporting evidence 
and  analysis.  State  studies  provide  the grounding  these  predictions 
lack. 
An early biennial  budgeting  study was conducted by the Council of 
State Governments  (CSG) in 1972  (CSG 1972).  Its analysis was based on 
a survey of executive  and legislative  officials  in 11 states  that had 9 
significantly  altered  their budget processes  between  the end of World 
War II and the early 1970s.  The one state moving to biennial budgeting, 
Hawaii,  reported 
allowed executive 
implementation  of 
that  the  change  reduced  budget  preparation  work  and 
budget staff time to conduct analyses required for the 
new budget-planning  procedures.  It was also reported 
that  biennial  budgeting  enabled  Hawaii's  legislature  to  scrutinize 
program  accomplishments  and  problems  more  closely,  and  that  state 
officials  expected  the change  to lead to a  ltsubstantiall'  reduction  in 
budget-related  work  (CSG 1972, 20-21). 
In contrast,  states moving  to from biennial  to annual  budgeting 
provided  evidence  of  an  increased  budget  workload  --  especially  in 
executive  agencies.  Numerous  respondents  from these  states  indicated 
that annual budgeting allowed less time for consideration of substantive 
issues,  provision  of  management  services,  and  research  into  the 
improvement of agency structures and program operations  (CSG  1972, 4-5). 
Officials from Wisconsin, meanwhile, reported that although the addition 
of a thorough off-year  review to their two-year budget  system had some 
adverse  effect  on policy  development  and administration,  budgeting  in 
the  second  year  was  still  only  one-third  as  time  consuming  as  full 
budget preparation  (CSG 1972, 21-22). 
A 1984 study conducted  for the Texas House  of Representatives  by 
the Public Policy Resources Laboratory of Texas A&M University  contains 
two sections relevant to the current discussion  (Wiggins and Hamm 1984). 
One section is the product of field interviews with public officials and 
observers  in five states that shifted from biennial  to annual budgeting 
between  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s.  The  Texas  A&M  interviewers 10 
found  that  state  agencies  experienced  increased  budget-preparation 
workloads  and costs,  though estimates of these costs were not provided 
and  their  magnitude  was  said  to  vary  from  state  to  state.  The 
researchers  also  reported  that  although  annual  budgeting  caused 
legislators  to  devote  greater  time  to  budget  issues,  interviewees 
stressed  that  this  additional  time  sometimes  came  at  the  expense  of 
program reviews and was not necessarily used to produced better budgets. 
The  researchers  illustrate  this perspective  by quoting  one  legislator 
who  recommended  a return  to biennial  budgeting  so  lawmakers  would  be 
better  able  l'to  consider  the budget  deliberatively"  (Wiggins and Hamm 
1984, section  III, 16-23). 
The  other  relevant  section  of  the  Texas  A&M  study  is  based  on 
responses  to a questionnaire  that surveyed  122 state agency heads  and 
309 lobbyists  in Texas.  Most respondents expected the work and cost of 
budget  preparation  would  increase  if Texas  adopted  annual  budgeting. 
This  view  was  held  by  three-fourths  of  both  the  administrators  and 
lobbyists  (Wiggins and Hamm 1984, section V, 6 and appendix  B, 3). 
Two  General  Accounting  Office  (GAO) studies  produced  during  the 
1980s  also  offer  insights  into  the  question  of  whether  biennial 
budgeting  permits  a  streamlining  of  the budget  process.  One  study, 
released  in  1984,  was  the  result  of  interviews  that  GAO  researchers 
conducted  with  officials  in  three  large  states  employing  biennial 
budgeting.  The other, published  in 1987, presented  data from a survey 
of  state  budget  officers  and  legislative  officials  in all  50  states. 
Both analyses were conducted to help shed light on issues raised during 
congressional  consideration  of federal biennial-budgeting  proposals. 11 
The  GAO's  case-oriented  study  found  that  a principal  benefit  of 
biennial budgeting  is that it allows executive and legislative officials 
more  time for management,  oversight  and other activities  beyond budget 
preparation  and approval  (Bowsher 1984; see also Myers  1982).  Similar 
findings  are contained  in the agency's  1987 report.  According  to the 
responses  to that survey,  states  that changed  from annual  to biennial 
sessions have more  time available  for program  reviews in the off-year, 
while  states moving  away  from two-year budgeting  report  that problems 
associated with an annual process include its extensive use of resources 
and  the  fact  that  it  diverts  agency  time  from  budget  execution  and 
program  analysis  (Kirkman 1987, 13 and 21-251.' 
Previous studies also shed light on two additional  issues.  First, 
a  number  of  the  aforementioned  studies  have  sought  to  go  beyond 
discussions  of overall budget work  in an effort to gauge  the impact of 
biennial  budgeting  on  the  use  of  budget  adjustments  (such  as 
supplemental appropriations and rescissions).  While the 1987 GAO report 
offers  "a slight  indication  of  decreased  adjustmentsff in  states  with 
annual budgets,  it concludes ultimately  that no strong pattern  emerges 
on this matter  (Kirkman 1987, 19 and 25).  The same conclusion  is drawn 
by authors of the 1984 Texas A&M report and by a 1994 study by Ronald K. 
Snell of the National Conference of State Legislatures  (NCSL).  In fact, 
Snell notes  that supplementals  have been used just as often  in states 
with annual and biennial budgets in recent years  (Wiggins and Hamm 1984, 
section  III, 14; Snell 1994, 8; and see also the discussion  of action 
taken to close state budget gaps in Posner 1993, 25-35). 
The  final  issue to be considered  before  turning  to findings  from the new  budgeting  survey  produced  by  the  state  of  New  Jersey  is  the 
suggestion  that  federal  budget  work  will  expand  to  fill  the  time 
available.  States do not stretch budget action over a two-year period. 
Instead, they employ a split-session model that confines such action to 
a single year  (Kirkman 1987, 26-28). 
The New Jersey Study 
12 
New  Jersey's  state  budget  office  (NJOMB)  distributed  a 
questionnaire  to  the  chief  budget  officials  in  states  with  biennial 
budgeting  in 1994.  Eleven budget officers responded by the end of that 
year and the results were compiled and released by the NJOMB in February 
of 1995.  Results of that survey -- conducted due to Governor Christine 
Todd Whitman's  interest  in moving  New 
provide new evidence on the question of 
streamline  fiscal decision-making. 
Jersey  to a two-year  budget  -- 
whether biennial budgeting helps 
The  New  Jersey  survey  invites  budget  officers  to  identify  the 
advantages and disadvantages of biennial budgeting.  Eight of the eleven 
officials  reply  that  such budgeting  saves  considerable  executive  and 
legislative  time relative  to an annual process.  Respondents  add  that 
this  streamlined  system  makes  more  time  available  for  policy 
evaluations,  management  studies  and  planning,  staff  training,  and 
program  operations  (NJOMB 1995, 2-3). 
The  aforementioned  view  is  reinforced  by  responses  to  a  later 
question  that  asks  how  biennial  budgeting  affects  time  for  program 
review, evaluation  and improved outcome measurement.  While  two states 
do not  think  that  the impact  is significant,  all others  argue  that  a 
two-year process  allows  --  at least in the year not devoted  to budget 13 
approval  --  more time for reviews, evaluations, measurements,  audits and 
planning.  It must be added, however,  that respondents  provide  a wide 
range of answers  to the question 
cost of preparing  budgets  (NJOMB 
Savings estimates associated 
of how biennial budgeting  affects  the 
1995, 14). 
with a two-year rather than a one-year 
budget period range from a few thousand dollars to the suggestion of two 
respondents  that the former system cuts budget costs in half.  Responses 
make  it  clear  that  cost  estimates  depend  heavily  on  auxiliary 
assumptions  such as whether  budget  agency  staff would  be augmented  or 
merely  reassigned  to  accommodate  a  shift  from  biennial  to  annual 
budgeting  (NJOMB 1995, 14-15).  This suggests that future research into 
the costs of biennial  versus  annual budgeting  should be as precise  as 
possible  about  the nature of the comparison being  investigated. 
Another  question  in  the  New  Jersey  study  asks  whether  mid-term 
budget  adjustments  are as time consuming  as preparation  of a separate 
budget.  Respondents are unanimous in their view that making adjustments 
during  the  two-year  fiscal  period  requires  less  work  than  annual 
budgeting.  Indeed,  some  note  that  the  time  saving  is  significant. 
Maine's budget office provides  the most concrete estimate  -- it reports 
that  adjustments  require  between  one-third  and  one-half  the  time 
necessary  for preparation  of  the initial budget.  Only one respondent 
(from Wisconsin)  indicates  that  a  revision  can  sometimes  require  an 
effort approaching  that of annual budgeting  (NJOMB 1995, 8-g).' 
Discussion 
The biennial-budgeting  survey conducted by the NJOMB combines with 
previous state studies to support the argument that biennial budgeting  - 14 
-  at least in its split-sessions form -- streamlines the budget process. 
This  experience  suggests  that a  two-year  federal  budget  period  (with 
split  sessions)  would  eliminate much procedural  repetition  and  enable 
executive  agencies  and Congress  to devote more  time to pursuits  beyond 
developing  and  defending  budgets.  It  also  suggests  that  biennial 
budgeting  would  lessen  somewhat  the feeling  among members  of Congress 
that  many  budget  decisions  are  made  in  haste  and  without  adequate 
consideration  given to their consequences.1o 
The  need  for budget  adjustments  might  increase  somewhat  under  a 
two-year  budget  and  appropriations  cycle.  But  state  experience 
indicates  that  biennial  budgeting  is  still  less  time  consuming  than 
annual  budgeting.  Moreover,  some budget  shortfalls  that would  cause 
states  to act  (due to balanced-budget  requirements)  might  be accepted 
more readily by the federal government  -- for even in the present  anti- 
deficit  era, many member  of Congress  still accept  the notion  that the 
national government should run at least a modest deficit during cyclical 
downturns  (Mongia 1995, 31-32).  This fact, combined with Snell's recent 
finding  (mentioned  above)  that  supplementals  are  not  more  common  in 
biennial-budgeting  states,  weakens  considerably  the  proposition  that 
biennial  budgeting  will become overwhelmed by fiscal revisions. 
The direct  savings  to be gained by adopting biennial  budgeting  at 
the federal level are not likely not translate into millions of dollars. 
Most legislative and agency employees affected by budget-work reductions 
would  probably  be  reassigned,  not  dismissed.  But  if  these  workers' 
energies  were  directed  toward  matters  such  as  oversight  and  the 
improvement  of service delivery,  substantial  indirect  savings could be 15 
realized  as a consequence  of making  federal policies more  effective. 
Making  Policies More Effective 
While  the  overall  federal  budget  operates  on  an  annual  basis, 
experiments  conducted  by a small number of agencies  and congressional 
committees  have put some budget  elements on a two-year  schedule during 
the past decade.  In the late-1980s, for example, members of the Senate 
broke with tradition and authorized funds for a biennial period for both 
the Justice  Department  and  intelligence  spending.  Senators  explained 
that  the  actions  were  taken  to  encourage  greater  executive-branch 
planning  and  to allow Congress  additional  time for non-budget  issues, 
including  the  opportunity  to  conduct  more  thorough  program  reviews 
(Congressional quarterly  almanac 1987, 283 and 1989, 546). 
The  only  academic  work  to  evaluate  a  federal  experiment  with 
biennial  budgeting  is  one  by  Robert  J.  Art  (1989)  that  reviews  its 
adoption  by  the  Department  of  Defense  (DOD).  The  1986  Defense 
Authorization  Act directed the DOD to submit budgets biennially  starting 
with  the  fiscal  year  1988.  According  to Art,  this  experiment  was  a 
"half successl' (Art 1989, 208). 
Since  Congress  refused  to authorize  and  appropriate  funds  for  a 
two-year  period,  agency  stability  was  not  enhanced.  Nevertheless, 
Pentagon  comptrollers  and  service  programmers  were  unanimous  in  the 
belief  that biennial  budget  preparation  was  beneficial.  Art  reports 
that  the  two-year  schedule  reduced  problems  associated  with  the 
overlapping  of budget  cycles and enabled the introduction  of analyses, 
evaluations  and plans that were widely viewed as having improved agency 
operations.  He writes:  biennial budgeting  allowed DOD officials  time 16 
"to do things they should have been doing but never could do because  of 
the ratrace of annual budgeting"  (Art 1989, 206). 
Art indicates that although specifying dollar amounts is difficult, 
gains  associated  with better  evaluation  and planning  are not  trivial. 
Biennial budgeting's  procurement  savings, however, are much more easily 
calculated  -- and Art  suggests  that per-unit  savings here  could be  50 
percent or more for some weapons.  In his view, better quality decisions 
and more  efficient  resource  utilization  are  the ultimate  benefits  of 
biennial  budgeting  (Art 1989, 208-213). 
State Studies 
Among  studies  of  state  experience,  New  Jersey's  survey  seeks  to 
most directly  explore  the question of whether biennial budgeting  makes 
policies more  effective.  In particular,  it asks if biennial  budgeting 
improves  program  performance  and  planning.  Eight  budget  officers 
respond  in  the  affirmative,  while  two  indicate  only  that  two-year 
budgeting  "should" engender such improvements  (one  wrote "we have no way 
of proving this assumption").  The remaining response is as follows:  "  I 
have  no data on its impact on planning and performance"  (NJOMB 1995, 15- 
16). 
State  studies  conducted  prior  to  the NJOMB  inquiry  shed  little 
light  on  the  matter  of  whether  budgeting  for  two  years  helps  make 
policies  more  effective.  Some  of  these  studies  explored  the 
relationship between biennial budgets and long-term planning, but their 
findings  were  largely  inconclusive.  Although  the  1987  GAO  study 
provides  some  evidence  that  biennial  budgeting  is  associated  with 
greater fiscal planning, other studies do not establish that a two-year budget  system  has  any  impact  on  the  amount 
research  and  analysis  (Kirkman  1987,  17-25 
section III, 15-16; and CSG 1972, g-10). 
Discussion 
17 
or  quality  of  long-range 
;  Wiggins  and  Hamm  1984, 
A  streamlined  budget  process  cannot  by  itself  guarantee  better 
government  policies.  Programs  and  agencies  can  only  be  improved  if 
members of both the executive and legislative branches commit themselves 
to  making  the  public  sector  function  more  effectively.  As  one 
respondent  in the Texas A&M study stated,  "If you have no destination, 
any road will take you there"  (Wiggins and Hamm 1984, section III, 15). 
Nevertheless,  widespread  criticism  of  the  present  process  (see,  for 
example,  references  cited  in  note  10)  combines  with  the  results  of 
inquiries  into state practices  and federal experiments  to suggest  that 
biennial  budgeting  would  yield  at  least  some  improvement  in  the 
development and execution of national policies  --  especially if Congress 
and the White House take advantage of the opportunity  to bolster policy 
planning  and stabilize  defense procurement. 
A  two-year  process  enables  officials  in both  the  executive  and 
legislative  branches  to devote more  time and resources  to the goal of 
making  policies  more  effective.  In addition,  it alleviates  problems 
caused  by  the  current  need  to prepare  a budget  without  knowledge  of 
action on a previous  one.  It may also reduce the benefits  that special 
interests gain from the hurried nature of the present process.11 
In recent years, many economic-policy analysts have emphasized  the 
need  for the nation's  lawmakers  to achieve not only  long-term  deficit 
reduction but also a fiscal orientation  that places greater emphasis on 18 
public  investment  (see,  for  example,  GAO  1992;  and  Sichel  1995). 
Biennial  budgeting  can contribute  to the goal of reducing  the federal 
budget deficit by providing  legislators with an opportunity  not only to 
give  closer  scrutiny  to  entitlements  and  other  forms  of  "mandatory" 
federal  spending  but  also  to  make  a  wide  range  of  policies  more 
effective-l2  Two-year budgeting  also enables Congress  to change  fiscal 
priorities  gradually  --  multi-year plans can be more easily set and met 
when budgets  are enacted biennially. 
Promoting  Economic Stability 
Supporters  of  biennial  federal  budgeting  suggest  that  two-year 
budgets  can promote  stability  at not only  the macroeconomic  level but 
also at the level of specific  individuals,  agencies  and corporations. 
Opponents  respond  that  stability  comes  only  at  the  expense  of  two 
important features of the present system:  flexibility and congressional 
control  (over  the  budget  and  the  executive  branch).  The  fact  that 
economic  priorities  and policies  may be maintained  for two years  at a 
time leads some to argue that a biennial  system will be insufficiently 
responsive  to both changing circumstances  and the public  interest. 
State Studies 
According to the GAO's 1984 biennial-budgeting  report, officials in 
states with  two-year budgeting  expressed  the belief  that the  system's 
benefits outweighed  its problems.  At the same time, they identified the 
following  as disadvantages: 
-- the increased difficulty in estimating accurately revenues 
and  expenditures  in  the  second  year  and  budgeting  for 
l'uncontrollablell  items,  such as changes  in expenditures  for 19 
entitlement  programs;  and 
-  _  the  legislature's  perceived  loss  of  control  over  the 
executive  and  state  agencies,  since  there  are  fewer 
opportunities  to make program  and budget  decisions  (Bowsher 
1984, 2-3). 
This provides  some evidence supporting the view that biennial budgeting 
requires  some loss of both flexibility and legislative  control. 
The NJOMB  study reinforces  the view that forecasting  accuracy  and 
fiscal  flexibility  are  greater  under  annual  budgeting  (there  is  no 
discussion  of  legislative  control).13  But  it  also  indicates  --  as 
discussed  earlier  -- that biennial budgets  are less time consuming  and 
less costly to prepare,  even after accounting for mid-term  corrections. 
The  principal  budget  complications  identified  by  states  are  the 
following:  economic  fluctuations;  unstable  federal  funding;  and 
unanticipated  Medicaid  expenses  (NJOMB 1995, 2-12). 
The New Jersey survey also asks whether biennial budgeting  provides 
greater  certainty  for managers  of public programs,  schools,  and  local 
units  of  government  that  depend  on  state  funding.  All  respondents 
indicate that two-year budgets increase stability and certainty,  though 
some note  that major  changes  in the economic  and/or political  climate 
can nullify  the potential  gains of a biennial  system  (NJOMB 1995,  15- 
16).  These findings confirm a view expressed by Snell in his 1994 NCSL 
report  (Snell 1994, 6-7).14 
Discussion 
State  experience  suggests  that  biennial  federal  budgeting  can 
contribute to public agency stability -- stability that enables managers 20 
to focus greater attention on matters including service delivery and the 
long-term  implications  of  program  operations.  It  also  appears  that 
state and  local governments  would be among  the chief beneficiaries  of 
the stability provided by two-year federal budgeting,  for much of their 
budget  uncertainty  is  traceable  to  matters  that  involve  (or can  be 
influenced  by)  federal  action.  Corporations  might  also  benefit  from 
this form of federal budgeting.  In particular, biennial federal budgets 
might allow private firms to extend their own planning horizons somewhat 
_ _  a  step  identified  by  numerous  research  studies  as  necessary  for 
continued  improvements  in U.S. competitiveness.15 
State studies provide no guidance on the matter of whether biennial 
federal budgeting  will promote macroeconomic  stability.16  But two-year 
budgets  can be compatible with both macro-level  economic  stability  and 
fiscal  discipline  if  policymakers  place  heavy  reliance  on  automatic 
stabilizers and establish a budgetary structure that generates deficits 
only  during  recessions.  While  political  economists  have  long  been 
concerned  about  the  destabilizing  effects  of  unanticipated  monetary 
policy  fluctuations,  we  should  not  ignore  the  similarly  disruptive 
impact of frequent and unpredictable  fiscal policy changes.17 
The  approach  to macroeconomic  stabilization  that  has  just  been 
described would  require Congress  to accept increased uncertainty  about 
the specific dollar amount of a given year's budget deficit.  While  the 
nation's  tax  and  expenditure  programs  can  be  structured  so  that  the 
deficit's  size falls within  a rather narrow  range, biennial  budgeting 
might make it more difficult to hit a particular  target figure during a 
period  of  economic  instability.  But  this  is  not  a  new  problem; 21 
legislators  have  always  had  to  decide  between  balancing  the  overall 
economy  and  balancing  the  budget  with  precision.  Macroeconomic 
stabilization does not mean that Congress has given up V'control,"  merely 
that it has  chosen  to control  the economy with  greater precision  than 
the annual budget  deficit.l' 
An examination of state experience with biennial budgeting permits 
three  additional  comments  on  congressional  control.  One  is  that 
Congress's control over the budget may be enhanced by biennial budgeting 
because the process gives legislators an increased opportunity  to review 
existing policies and expenditures.  Another is that Congress can retain 
some control over apportionment of funds across the biennium by enacting 
two one-year appropriations  (rather than a consolidated two-year budget) 
at the start of each budget period.  According  to Snell,  17 of the 20 
biennial-budgeting  states allocate appropriations  in this manner  (Snell 
1994, 3).19 A third observation  is that although some suggest biennial 
budgeting  might  cause  Congress  write  even  more  l'micro-management" 
provisions  into law, evidence from the Texas A&M study contradicts  that 
suggestion  (Meyers 1988, 29; Wiggins  and Hamm  1984, section  III, 27). 
In  short,  executive-legislative  relations  should  not  be  altered 
significantly  by biennial  federal budgeting.  (For a similar view,  see 
Mann  (1993).) 
While  it  is  questionable  that  biennial  budgets  will  reduce 
congressional  control, one cannot deny that some tradeoff exists between 
the  flexibility  of annual budgeting  and the stability  -- and increased 
opportunity  for policy analysis and planning  -- of two-year budgeting. 
Nevertheless,  there are a number of reasons for choosing the more stable 22 
budget process  over the more flexible annual system.  First, budgetary 
stability  is beneficial.  As Alice Rivlin has written: 
Too  frequent  changes  can  be  counterproductive.  Transfer 
payments need to be predictable so that peoples' lives are not 
disrupted.  Military capability suffers if signals change too 
often.  Procurement  costs can go up, not down, if production 
lines are alternately  speeded up, slowed down, or even halted 
pending  Congressional  action.  .  .  .  Indeed,  almost  all 
programs  would  work  better  if  authorizations  and 
appropriations  were  enacted  for  several  years  at  a  time. 
About  the only  exceptions  are disaster  assistance,  military 
contingencies,  or  countercyclical  programs  where  triggering 
mechanisms  are not applicable  (quoted in Ford 1981, 28954). 
Second,  biennial  budgeting  is  not  entirely  inflexible. 
Supplemental  appropriations,  rescissions  and other  adjustments  can be 
made  in  the  event  of  changing  circumstances  that  require  immediate 
action.  Moreover,  because  changes  can  be  implemented  gradually  and 
policies  do  not  need  to  go  into  effect  as  quickly  as  under  annual 
budgeting,  biennial  budgeting  permits  large  policy  changes  to  be 
introduced  in an orderly  fashion.  (For a similar view,  see Wildavsky 
(1988, 4151.1 
Finally,  scholarly articles by Rivlin and reports by the GAO both 
indicate  that the current  federal budgeting  system is one that permits 
too much  flexibility  and suffers from too little stability,  continuity 
and policy planning  (Rivlin 1981 and 1984; GAO 1989 and 1992).20 AS U.S. 
Comptroller  General  Charles  Bowsher  stated  during  one  congressional 23 
hearing, flexibility in the current process comes "at a high price."  In 
particular,  his testimony identified a number of features that keep the 
process flexible and noted that such arrangements  "invite revisitings of 
the  issues  and  make  the budget  process  vulnerable  to  extraneous  and 
time-consuming  delays."  Bowsher concluded that this flexibility  "gives 
members  of  Congress  the  feeling  that  the  budget  process  is  out  of 
control  and  never-ending,"  and he  encouraged  lawmakers  to  experiment 
with  two-year budgets  (Bowsher 1988). 
Conclusion 
This article demonstrates  that fiscal theory does not identify one 
budget  period  as  universally  appropriate.  Annual  budgeting  is  not 
inherently  llsuperiortl  to multi-year  budgeting.  An appropriate  budget 
period  can  be  identified  only  after  one  weighs  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of alternate  arrangements. 
The  evidence  reviewed  in  this  article  suggests  that  biennial 
budgeting  can  indeed  offer  significant  benefits  if  adopted  at  the 
federal  level.  Although  use  of  supplementals  and  other  budget 
adjustments  might  increase  somewhat,  biennial  budgeting  should 
streamline the budget process in a way that reduces overall budget work 
and allows more time for management, oversight, and consideration  of the 
long-term  consequences  of  fiscal  decisions.  Moreover,  by  taking 
advantage  of  the  opportunity  to  focus  more  attention  on  non-budget 
matters,  agencies and Congress can improve the effectiveness  of federal 
policies.  While direct savings from budget streamlining might be small, 
indirect savings resulting from efforts to make policies more effective 
could be substantial. 24 
Biennial  budgeting  also  promotes  economic  and  social  stability. 
While this stability requires little reduction in congressional control, 
flexibility  will  indeed  be  reduced  under  a  two-year  budget  system. 
However,  this  author  sides with  Rivlin  and others  who  argue  that  the 
benefits  of  increased  stability  would  outweigh  the  small  degree  of 
flexibility  lost.21 
State  experience  suggests  that biennial  federal  budgeting  should 
involve  not  only  split  sessions  but  also  separate  appropriations  for 
each year of the biennium.  The former would allow each new Congress  to 
enact  a  budget  during  its  first  session.22  The  latter  would  help 
lawmakers  retain some control over apportionment  of funds. 
Biennial  budgeting  does not make budgeting  less difficult.  Even 
under a biennial  system, budgeting remains at the heart of the political 
process.  Indeed, budgets  are inherently both  a product  and  source  of 
political  conflict.  Moreover,  much  more  than  the  budget  period 
determines the effectiveness of budgeting  --  relevant factors range from 
the  legislature's  committee  structure  to  the  degree  to  which 
participants  in  the  process  are  committed  to  following  established 
procedures.23 
There  are  a  number  of  areas  where  federal  policymakers  might 
benefit  from  additional  research  on  biennial  state  budgeting.  The 
impact of biennial  budgeting  on budget preparation,  for example,  could 
use more  investigation;  this work might  include an attempt  to estimate 
the  dollar  savings  associated  with  biennial  versus  annual  budgets. 
There  has  also  been  little  exploration  of  the nature  and use  of non- 
budget year fiscal reviews and adjustment mechanisms.  Congress would be 25 
acting  carelessly  if  it  adopted  biennial  budgeting  without  first 
studying and considering  the federal applicability  of state review and 
adjustment  procedures  --  including any that might be used  to constrain 
supplementals.24 
There has also been  little research into the particular  practices 
employed by biennial-budgeting  states in their effort to improve policy 
development  and  service  delivery.  Perhaps  this  work  would  be  best 
undertaken  in  the  form  of  case  research.  Connecticut  and  Nebraska 
should be given special attention due to their rather recent shift to a 
two-year  fiscal period. 
The types of research just mentioned could be especially useful  in 
the present  political  climate  -- one  that appears highly  conducive  to 
procedural  change  and  institutional  reform.  Perhaps  Vice-President 
Gore's NPR report was not too far from the mark when  it suggested  that 
"the time is ripe" for biennial budgeting  (Gore 1993, 17). 
Notes 
1.  While budgeting details vary, state and federal budget processes  are 
quite  similar  overall.  In  addition,  Gerald  H.  Miller,  executive 
director  of  the National  Association  of State Budget  Officers,  argues 
that many state budgets are every bit as complex as that of the federal 
budget  (discussed in Rauch 1986, 2319). 
2.  Despite  a system of annual appropriations,  entitlements  and other 
forms of "mandatory1  spending account for about two-thirds of present- 
day federal budgets  (Schick 1995, 130-132). 
3.  This review of state budgeting  trends is based upon  the historical 
discussion  presented  in Wiggins  and Hamm  (1984, section II). 26 
4.  The  dominant  biennial-budgeting  models  are  discussed  in  Kirkman 
(1989).  Kirkman's  report also discusses a lWsummitV'  proposal  fashioned 
after  a 1987 executive-legislative  branch  agreement  that set  two-year 
goals  for  broad  categories  of  federal  spending.  That  discussion 
illustrates  the  fact  that  "biennial budgeting"  has  long been  a  label 
with  no  set meaning.  Nevertheless,  the  term  refers  most  often  to a 
system involving a two-year budget and appropriations cycle  (with  multi- 
year  authorizations)  --  and  this  more  common  form  of  "biennial 
budgeting"  is the subject of the present article. 
5.  Among  the  many  budget  deadlines  missed  often  is  passage  of 
appropriations  legislation by the start of the fiscal year.  Since 1975, 
Congress  and  the  White  House  have  met  this  October  1  deadline  only 
twice. 
6.  For  a  range  of  views  on  biennial  budgeting,  see:  U.S.  Senate 
(1987); and U.S. House of Representatives  (1993). 
7.  For a detailed  account of federal budgeting,  see  (Schick 1995). 
8.  Kirkman's  study  also  surveyed  officials  in  states  with  annual 
legislative  sessions  and  biennial  budgets  to  learn  whether  their 
legislatures  devote  less  time  to  budgeting  in  the  lVoff-year.'V 
Respondents  in 11 of 12 states reported that their legislatures  devote 
less time to budget matters  in a non-budget  year  -- and two-thirds  of 
the respondents indicated that their legislatures spend "much less time" 
in such activities  during  the off-year  (Kirkman 1987, 28-29). 
9.  According  to  responses  to  another  question  posed  by  the  NJOMB 
survey, fiscal corrections  seldom represent a sizeable  fraction of the 
annual budget  (estimates provided  range from  .04 percent  to 1 percent) 27 
(NJOMB 1995, 5-7). 
10.  For  a  sampling  of  statements  expressing  the view  that  important 
budget  issues  receive  inadequate  attention  under  the present  process, 
see the following:  American  Enterprise  Institute  (1983, 1); Margeson 
and Saturn0  (1987, 5); Nunn  (1992, 5); and Domenici  (1992, 2). 
11.  According  to Wiggins  and Hamm, lobbyists surveyed on the prospect 
of  moving  Texas  to  an  annual  budgeting  system  reported  that  such 
budgeting  would  provide  them with  "a greater  chance  to influence  the 
budget"  (Wiggins and Hamm  1984, section V, 5). 
12.  While  a  further  discussion  of  the relationship  between  biennial 
budgeting  and deficit  reduction will be presented  in the next  section, 
two points  are warranted  at present.  One is that the present-day  goal 
of deficit  reduction  is not necessarily  incompatible  with  a budgetary 
structure  that generates  deficits during recessions.  According  to the 
Congressional  Budget  Office  (CBO), federal deficits  have  for over  two 
decades  been  consistently  greater  than  what  countercyclical 
macroeconomic  policy  would  have  required  (CBO 1994,  4  and  87).  The 
other  point  is  that  although  some  have  suggested  agencies  would  pad 
their  budgets  under  a  biennial-budget  system  (due  to  the  reduced 
reliability of two-year projections),  state experiences reviewed by the 
Texas A&M study do not support this contention  (Wiggins and Hamm  1984, 
section III, 14 and section V, 6).  (This last point  is also supported 
by the discussion  of state spending found in Snell  (1994, 8)). 
13.  It should be noted  that one  respondent  to the New  Jersey  survey 
indicated biennial revenue forecasts are often more accurate than annual 
forecasts  because  short-term  fluctuations  tend to even  themselves  out 28 
over a period of two years  (NJOMB 1995, 10).  This possibility  was also 
mentioned  in the GAO's 1984 study of biennial  state budgeting  (Bowsher 
1984, 5). 
14.  Snell  adds  that  even  annual  budgeting  is  rather  predictable  in 
stable  times,  because  programs  are  seldom  susceptible  to  sweeping 
changes  (Snell 1994, 7).  But the existence  of such predictability  is 
not necessarily  an argument  against biennial  budgeting  -- indeed,  one 
could  argue  instead  that  it  provides  additional  support  for  such 
budgeting. 
15.  For discussions of short-term time horizons in America,  see Michael 
Dertouzos  and  the  MIT  Commission  on  Industrial  Productivity  (1989); 
Competitiveness  Policy Council  (1992); and Michael  Porter  (1992). 
16.  Although  annual budgeting  is used by nearly all our international 
competitors,  other  industrial democracies have parliamentary  political 
systems  and/or  planning  mechanisms  that  give  fiscal  policy  greater 
stability  than it has in the United States.  For a discussion  of multi- 
year  direction  setting  in Japan,  for example,  see Ronald  Dore  (1986, 
132-134). 
17.  For an early discussion of the need for stability in fiscal policy, 
see Lewis H. Kimmel  (1959, 279-283). 
18.  For  more  on  the  choice  between  balancing  the  economy  and  the 
deficit,  see Mongia  (1995) and Meyers  (1988, 28-30). 
19.  Under a system with  two sets of one-year appropriations,  Congress 
might  choose  to index certain second-year outlays  to inflation. 
20.  According  to the GAO, America's  federal budget  process  "needs to 
adopt a longer-term planning horizon linking fiscal policy with broader 29 
goals  for the performance  of the economyI'  (GAO 1992, 16). 
21.  In a letter to the author dated August  2, 1993, Rivlin  reiterated 
her support  for biennial  budgeting. 
22.  For a fuller discussion  of the timing of biennial  budgeting  (and 
implications  for political  stability), see Bowsher  (1984, 6) and Irving 
(1993,  6).  Also,  note  that  extension  of  the  budget  period  is 
constrained  by  the  length  of  the  election  cycle  in  the  House  Of 
Representatives. 
23.  For  more  comprehensive  discussions  of  improving  financial 
management  within the federal government, see Bowsher  (1984, 8-9); Gore 
(1993); NPR  (1993); and Symposium on NPR recommendations  (1995, 4-42). 
24.  A brief discussion of state budget review and adjustment mechanisms 
can be found in NJOMB  (1995, 7-8). 
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